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INTRODUCTION
Determining the constitutionality of government subsidi-
zation of expression is one of the most frustrating tasks facing
scholars of the First Amendment. Initially, one may legitimately
ask whether courts should ever deem government subsidization
to violate the right of free expression. One might reasonably
argue that as long as government in no way affirmatively
restricts or punishes expression, it does not violate the First
Amendment guarantee. While this position, originally well
accepted, wisely has been rejected by more modern decisions, the
conclusion that selective governmental subsidization of ex-
pression implicates the First Amendment ultimately raises more
questions than it resolves.
The primary difficulty is that a reasonable observer quite
probably will have very different intuitive reactions concerning
the constitutionality of various examples of government subsidy.
Furthermore, a reasonable observer will have no self-evident
method of articulating a coherent, principled rationale to explain
those different reactions. For example, one reasonably could
accept the government's "subsidization" of the Vice President's
trip to speak in favor of a proposed political program, even
though the government refuses to subsidize the speech of the
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program's leading opponent.1 Yet, most constitutional observers
would find very troubling the government's decision to fund only
those scholars who agree with its positions. Similarly, many
constitutional observers have vehemently criticized the Supreme
Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan2 upholding governmental
refusal to subsidize clinics that inform their patients about the
availability of abortion.3 Presumably none of those critics,
however, would deem unconstitutional the cancellation of a
contract with the Congressional Records printer because the
printer insisted on including its own pro-choice material in the
Record.
The task at hand is to develop an analytical structure that
simultaneously provides coherent, generalized criteria by which
to measure the constitutionality of government-funding de-
cisions, while it fosters the values underlying the free speech
guarantee. To date, none of the judicial or scholarly attempts to
provide such an approach has been successful. The Supreme
Court's hopelessly incoherent analysis in Rust4 sadly under-
scores the confusion and futility of its approach. And while the
efforts of commentators perhaps do not deserve the criticism
more appropriately leveled at the Court's insufficient analytical
attempts, they, too, ultimately fail, either because they focus on
what are largely tangential or irrelevant factors, or because they
lump issues of free expression with other constitutionally
protected interests.5
In this Article, we propose an analytical structure that
substantially advances the inquiry. Our structure is designed to
categorize and conceptualize different forms of government
subsidy based on their respective impacts on the normative
theoretical values underlying the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. We incorporate into the analysis-developed by means
of ex ante categorical balancing-common sense practical
limitations on constitutional restriction of government subsidi-
1. See infra text accompanying note 85 (discussing the funding of the Vice
President's travels as an example of a permitted limited employee subsidy).
2. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 105-111 (explaining regulations that
prohibited clinics receiving funding from the Department of Health and Human
Services from providing information about abortion).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 112-121 (describing and critiquing
the Court's reasoning in Rust).
5. See discussion infra at Part IV (outlining and critiquing alternative
models for analyzing governmental subsidization of speech).
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zation that is designed to prevent the free speech guarantee
from counterproductively undermining the values it protects.
6
Put most simply, our approach allows, to the extent feasible,
government subsidization when it promotes the values underly-
ing free expression and prohibits it when it undermines those
values.7
Our structure initially draws a distinction between what we
call "negative" subsidies and "positive" subsidies.' We deem
negative subsidies-the subsidies given to a private individual
or entity to induce that individual or entity to remain
silent-presumptively unconstitutional. Only when the govern-
ment can both establish that it has a compelling interest and
show that it has tailored its negative subsidization to meet this
interest may the government provide a negative subsidy. In
short, our structure permits negative subsidies only when
current First Amendment jurisprudence would allow direct
infringement of free speech.
Our approach divides positive government-speech
subsidies-subsidies expended to encourage entities or indi-
viduals to speak-into two groups that we term "policy" subsi-
dies and "auxiliary" subsidies.9 Policy subsidies include situ-
ations in which the government either funds the speech of "core"
policy-making government employees or makes a political
appointment based at least in part on that appointee's prior
expression. We deem this government activity constitutional.
Analysis of auxiliary subsidies is more complicated. We divide
these subsidies into three subcategories: "categorical" subsidies,
"viewpoint-based" subsidies, and subsidies of "judgmental
necessity."10 The government grants a categorical subsidy of
6. See infra text accompanying notes 46-51 (articulating prevailing
theories on the value of free speech); discussion infra Part 1I.C.1. (explaining
the effects of positive subsidies on free speech values).
7. It is not always possible to draw a strict dichotomy between the two
situations. See discussion infra Part lI.C. (discussing when government fimding
might either promote or undermine free speech values). When this is so, we
seek to draw an ex ante categorical balance. See infra text accompanying notes
100-103 (arguing that the benefits of allowing governmental subsidies as a
judgmental necessity outweigh the risks).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 54-56 (describing the difference
between positive and negative subsidies and their constitutional implications).
9. See infra Part 1.C.2. and accompanying text (explaining the distinction
between "policy" and "auxiliary" subsidies).
10. Subsidies of judgmental necessity are at times inevitably viewpoint
based. See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text (describing the
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speech when it makes a viewpoint-neutral choice to fund a
particular category, subject or class of expression, such as when
it chooses to fund art. We deem such subsidization of expression
constitutional. The government grants a viewpoint-based
subsidy of speech when it funds a speaker because of the
viewpoint espoused by that speaker, such as when the govern-
ment chooses to fund the work of a particular artist because she
produces art glorifying the Republican Party. Our approach
generally deems this type of subsidy unconstitutional."
Finally, the government provides a subsidy of "judgmental
necessity" when it selects among applicants for funding within
a categorical subsidy of speech, such as when the government
chooses between two artists applying for government funding, or
between two researchers in similar areas seeking governmental
support of their research. Our approach considers these types
of subsidies to be conditionally constitutional. The choice of one
speaker over another is constitutional if the government bases
its decision on criteria "substantially related" to the predescribed
viewpoint-neutral purpose of the subsidy. 2 In essence, judg-
mental necessity allows the government to subsidize a narrow
group of necessarily content-based expression and an even
narrower group of inevitably viewpoint-based expression. As
such, our approach does not view subsidies made of judgmental
necessity as alternatives to categorical and viewpoint-based
subsidies. Rather, in certain instances, they constitute narrow
exceptions to the general unconstitutionality of viewpoint-based
subsidies.
This structure will allow courts to calibrate the constitution-
ality of government subsidies simply by locating the challenged
subsidy within the model's established structural framework. 3
Whereas legitimate disputes may arise over exactly where a
characteristics and analysis of subsidies of judgmental necessity).
11. The model's exception to the ban on viewpoint-based subsidies will
include some of those subsidies that fall within the terms of the "judgmental
necessity" category. See infra text accompanying notes 100-101 (arguing that
the benefits of allowing governmental subsidies made as ajudgmental necessity
outweigh the risks).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 100-101 (explaining the requirement
that a decision to subsidize be "substantially related" to the pre-described goals
and purposes of the program to fit under the judgmental-necessity provision).
13. See infra note 102 and accompanying text (explaining the structure of
the inquiry to be used by the Court in analyzing a challenged subsidy).
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particular type of subsidy should be placed, 4 whatever doc-
trinal and conceptual difficulties to which our structure might
give rise pale in comparison to the overwhelming confusion that
plagues previously suggested approaches. 5 More importantly,
our structure possesses the distinct advantage of tailoring
constitutional regulation to foster universally accepted free
speech values. 6
Before we more fully articulate the rationale for and
implications of our structure, we examine the logically prior
question of why government-subsidy decisions ever violate the
First Amendment. Unless one concludes that a refusal to
subsidize constitutes a prima facie abridgement of constitution-
ally protected expression, no need arises to calibrate the
constitutionality of different types of subsidization. In addition,
an exploration of exactly how governmental refusals to subsidize
might undermine the values underlying free speech protection
assists in devising a structure that most effectively fosters those
values. Hence, Part I of the Article focuses on this preliminary
inquiry. Part II explains the structure and rationale of our
approach. In Part III, we apply our proposed structure to
several of the most troubling and frustrating examples of
government subsidy. In Part IV, we critique alternative
attempts to frame analytical models for the determination of the
constitutionality of governmental-subsidy decisions.
No analytical structure is free from doubt or question; any
time one applies generalized standards to specific, concrete facts,
the possibility of uncertainty and ambiguity exists. But when
properly crafted, such models can help assure that judicial
decision-making fulfills the underlying normative values that the
law is designed to serve. No area of law requires greater
assurance of this than the convoluted area of governmental
subsidization of expression.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 97-103 (discussing the possible
ambiguities arising from the government's efforts to award viewpoint-neutral
subsidies).
15. See discussion infra Part IV (exploring the comparative merits of
alternative models previously suggested for measuring the constitutionality of
government subsidization of expression).
16. See discussion infra Part II.C.l.a. (describing the positive effects of
positive subsidies on free speech values).
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I. DENIAL OF SUBSIDIZATION AS ABRIDGEMENT:
GOVERNMENT FUNDING AND THE VALUE OF FREE
EXPRESSION
A. THE RIGHT-PRIVILEGE DISTINCTION AND THE CONCEPT OF
"UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS"
Writing for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,' then Judge Holmes
succinctly described the traditional view concerning the constitu-
tionality of the government's denial of a subsidy because of
expression. He stated that "[tihe petitioner may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to
be a policeman." 8 The logical basis in support of this position
derives from two premises. First, by definition, a governmental
subsidy is a matter of governmental largesse, and the greater
governmental power to deny the subsidy logically includes the
lesser power to grant the subsidy conditionally on the waiver of
a constitutional right. Second, if the individual chooses to
exercise her right of speech rather than receive the subsidy, she
is in no worse a position than if the government had offered her
no subsidy in the first place.
Modern scholarship and doctrine have, for the most part, 9
rejected this deceptively simple logic under the terms of the so-
called "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine,2 ° although the
constitutional grounding for this rejection has not always been
17. 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
18. Id. at 517.
19.. Not all scholars find the logic of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
to be persuasive. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion,
Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990) (arguing that the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine should be abandoned). Moreover, in certain areas the
Supreme Court has, without explanation, completely ignored the doctrine's logic.
See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
80 (1982) (holding that under the "public rights" doctrine, the federal
government may condition, where it creates a substantive statutory right,
acceptance of that right on adjudication of the right in a non-Article III forum);
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 450 (1977) (applying the "public rights" doctrine to the Seventh Amend-
ment right to civil jury trial).
20. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968) (contending
that the erosion of "privilege" in the public-sector context has required the
creation of substantive due process provisions to protect against the state).
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entirely clear. The fallacy of the traditional analysis, however,
is evident in the context of equal protection.2' The government
may deny welfare to all citizens. It does not logically follow,
however, that this "greater" power to deny welfare includes the
"lesser" power to grant welfare to whites only. The right of
equal protection constitutes its own free-standing right to equal
treatment. No comparable independent constitutional right to
receive welfare exists.22 Thus, the Constitution does not render
the power to deny welfare "greater" than the power to deny
welfare to non-whites only. Outside of areas subjected to strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, however, the logic
behind the modern rejection of the traditional right-privilege
distinction is uncertain.
According to Professor Kathleen Sullivan,23 commentators
and jurists traditionally have justified the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine on three grounds. The first rationale "locates
the harm of rights-pressuring conditions on government benefits
in their coercion of the beneficiary."24 Sullivan recognizes,
however, that "In]either the Court nor the commentary... has
developed a satisfying theory of what is coercive about unconsti-
tutional conditions. Conclusory labels often take the place of
analysis."2" The second rationale focuses on the legislative
impropriety of engaging in such activities.26 This explanation
begs the initial question: Unless the practice is defective in the
first place, how can there be legislative impropriety? Finally,
Sullivan notes that one can justify the doctrine on the basis of
the "essential inalienability" of constitutional rights.27 Unfortu-
nately this answer appears to suffer from the fatal problem of
circularity, asserting only that constitutional rights are inalien-
able because they are constitutional. Such reasoning also runs
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1: "No State shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
22. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
195 (1989) ("The [Equal Protection] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the
State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and
security.").
23. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Uncon'stitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413 (1989).
24. Id. at 1419.
25. Id. at 1420.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1421. Professor Sullivan notes that this approach "has never been
prominent in the cases at all, but is suggested by contemporary debate among
commentators about limits on permissible exchange." Id.
550 [Vol. 80:543
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contrary to a considerable body of established constitutional
doctrine that recognizes a citizen's ability to waive constitutional
rights.2
8
Various commentators have suggested alternate theoretical
rationales to explain the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Sullivan, for example, has proposed her own approach that
"focuses not on the individual beneficiary, the legislative process,
or the alienability of a right, but rather on the systemic effect of
conditions on the distribution of rights in the polity as a
whole."29 She argues that unconstitutional conditions "impli-
cate three distributive concerns." 0 First, "they permit circum-
vention of existing constitutional restraints on direct regu-
lation";3 second, they undermine "the maintenance of govern-
ment neutrality or evenhandedness among rightholders"; 2 and
third, they foster "discrimination among rightholders who would
otherwise make the same constitutional choice, on the basis of
their relative dependency on a government benefit.""
The validity of Sullivan's suggested rationale for the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, as well as those suggested
by other commentators, 34 may well be appropriate subject of
debate.3 One also could examine the Supreme Court's puzzling
and seemingly unexplained selective use of the doctrine.36
28. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311,315-16
(1964) (holding that a due-process objection to personal jurisdiction is subject
to waiver through contract). Similarly, the Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial may be waived with relative ease. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38.
29. Sullivan, supra note 23, at 1421.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of
Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1984)
(suggesting that affirmative governmental intrusion in the form of benefits has
exceeded negative government action as a form of coercion); Albert J. Rosenthal,
Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103,
1125-33 (1987) (measuring the extent to which conditions attached to
congressional spending may exceed, in effect, direct regulations Congress would
be barred from enacting). See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court,
1987 Term, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power and the Limits
of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1987) (explaining the various opinions about
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in judicial and academic circles).
35. See generally Sunstein, supra note 19 (stating that the validity of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is subject to question).
36. See supra note 19 (citing cases in which the Supreme Court, inexpli-
cably, opted not to employ the unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
1996]
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Present purposes, however, do not require exploration of these
issues. Regardless of the validity of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine as a general matter, the doctrine's constitu-
tional basis becomes easy to comprehend when viewed from the
limited perspective of free expression. We therefore turn to a
discussion of that limited perspective.
B. GOVERNMENT SUBSIIms AND THE VALUE OF
FREE EXPRESION
1. Constitutional Text: Subsidy Denials as "Abridgements"
By its terms, the First Amendment prohibits the "abridge-
ment" of free speech." Thus, the inquiry, at least as an initial
matter,38 must focus on whether a challenged governmental
action "abridges" the free speech right. Courts have not
construed the concept of "abridgement" to require that govern-
ment physically prevent a private individual or entity from
speaking.3 9 Issuance of an injunction, for example, does not
physically halt expression; it merely means that if the subject of
the injunction engages in the prohibited expression she will be
subject to a contempt citation. ° In such a situation, a court
gives the individual the option of not speaking and avoiding
contempt, or speaking subject to imposition of the contempt
penalty. Yet courts have established that such injunctions
constitute classic examples of presumptively unconstitutional
abridgements.4 Similarly, one sentenced to prison because of
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech .... "
38. The mere fact that a prima facie abridgement is shown does not
necessarily mean that the regulation is unconstitutional.
39. Such physical prevention, however, may constitute at least a prima
facie abridgement.
40. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967)
(holding that punishment for violating an otherwise unconstitutional injunction
is not a violation of a person's free speech rights). However, unlike defendants
accused of criminal violations, a defendant prosecuted for contempt generally
is not, under the "collateral bar" rule, permitted to raise as a defense the
unconstitutionality of the injunction. Compare id. (holding that a defendant
accused of violating an injunction cannot challenge the constitutionality of the
injunction) with Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51
(1969) (holding a criminal ordinance that imposed a limitation identical to the
injunction upheld in Walker to be a violation of the First Amendment).
41. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (holding that
prior restraints on expression have a strong presumption ofunconstitutionality).
552
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his expression is not physically prevented from speaking.42 The
government instead has offered him the "option" of not speaking
and staying out of jail, or speaking, burdened with the penalty
of a prison sentence. Most people presumably would agree that
imposition of a prison sentence constitutes a prima facie
"abridgement" of protected expression.
When government ties subsidies to expression, then, the
mere fact that the government's actions do not physically prevent
expression does not mean that such actions fail to "abridge" the
free speech right. The textual question ought to be whether the
government's actions penalize protected expression. Contempt
citations, prison sentences and civil and criminal fines constitute
prima facie abridgements because they penalize speech.
At first glance one might think that government subsidies
directly tied to expression present a different situation, since,
unlike the above-mentioned examples, with such subsidies the
government does not affirmatively impose a new burden on the
speaker because of his expression. At worst, the government
merely is denying the citizen a benefit to which he had no
overriding right in the first place. In a sense, then, the speaker
finds himself in arguably the same position as before he spoke.
The same could not be said, of course, of the speaker sent to
prison or subjected to a fine. The proper question, however, is
not whether, because of his expression,43 the government placed
the speaker in a worse position than if it had granted no benefit
at all, but whether the government placed the speaker in an
unambiguously worse position than if he had not spoken at all.
If so, the government has "penalized" him for his expression, in
much the same sense as when he has been fined or imprisoned
because of his expression. From a purely linguistic perspective,
then, his right of expression is "abridged," much as it is when he
is fined or imprisoned.
One can argue that the severity of the penalty is consid-
erably greater when the government fines or imprisons a
speaker as compared to when the government merely denies the
speaker a subsidy. Although this point may be accurate in the
42. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951)
(upholding prison sentences imposed on individuals because of expressive
activity).
43. Whether the speaker has been placed in a worse position because of his
expression or rather because of an unrelated reason, of course, presents a
factual issue that will have to be resolved in the individual case.
19961
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
majority of cases, it is not always true. One easily could
conceive a government subsidy so central to an individual's well
being" that the denial of it will, as a practical matter, have at
least as much adverse impact as would a fine or prison sentence.
In any event, the point is irrelevant to answering whether a
subsidy denial potentially constitutes a prima facie violation of
the First Amendment. To be sure, the extent or severity of the
abridgement can influence the outcome of a pragmatic judicial
calculus in an individual case,45 but, at least as a prima facie
matter, any abridgement-no matter how small-can trigger a
First Amendment inquiry. A $50 fine could "abridge" an
individual's free speech right the same as would a $50,000 fine
or a 20-year prison sentence.
2. Government Subsidies and Free Speech Theory
When one adds a normative theoretical perspective to the
analysis, it becomes apparent that a denial of a subsidy can
undermine the value or values we seek to foster by the pro-
tection of free expression. The important point to note is that
this is true regardless of how one comes down in the debate over
the proper course of First Amendment theory.
The theories underlying the First Amendment's protection
of freedom of expression can, roughly, be placed into two broad
categories: communitarian and autonomy.46 Supporters of the
former argue that free speech is necessary to the processes of
community and self-government; that free speech protects "the
common needs of all the members of the body politic.""
44. Examples are food stamps or Medicaid.
45. Of course, one could adopt a so-called "absolutist" position on free
speech. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EX-
PRESSION 17 (1970) (explaining the absolutist view of free speech). Under this
approach, the mere finding of "abridgement" automatically will lead to a finding
of unconstitutionality. Neither the Supreme Court nor the majority of
commentators, however, has accepted this view. For purposes of this Article,
we take no position on the question. For a detailed discussion of the issue, see
MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 52-55, 191-
206 (1984).
46. It must be conceded that issues of free speech theory do not always fall
into the terms of so simplistic a dichotomy. For present purposes, however,
recognition of these two broad categories is sufficient.
47. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLrrICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 8-9 (1960); see also Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value
in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527-28 (explaining
the ability of a free press to expose actions of the government); Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1555-58 (1988)
[Vol. 80:543
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Alternatively, the latter theories contend that people should view
protection of free speech "not as a means to a collective good but
because of the value of speech conduct to the individual."" Our
objective here does not require a proclamation of one of the two
theories as superior, because, for our purposes, it matters little
which normative approach one prefers. Regardless of one's
theoretical outlook, the government's decision to fund the
expression of some individuals or entities but not others can
amount to an abridgement of speech, because that decision may
undermine the principles underlying either theory. This occurs
because the grant or denial of a subsidy can deter individual
expression, artificially skew the nature of public debate, or both.
Selective award of governmental subsidies undermines the
autonomy values served by free speech protection because the
government's action influences a private individual either not to
say anything or not to say what she would have said absent the
government's influence. Thus, the threat of a subsidy denial
wipes out, or at a minimum stunts, whatever self-developmental
or actualization benefits the individual would have gained as a
result of genuine (non-subsidization influenced) expressive
activity.
One might argue that governmental-subsidy denials do not
violate the First Amendment autonomy/self-development value
because the ultimate choice not to speak is the individual's. As
explained above, however, one could say the same of any
governmental penalty for expression short of placing tape over
a speaker's mouth prior to her speaking. In almost every
instance, the individual can choose to speak, as long as she will
accept the consequences. Of course, one can also persuasively
contend that when imprisonment or a heavy fine is the alterna-
tive to remaining silent, the individual's choice not to speak is
not "free." The same can be said when the government links a
valuable subsidy to the individual's choice not to speak or to the
individual's message. In neither case does the individual make
(articulating a republican belief grounded in a guaranteed right to participate
in public deliberation).
48. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978); see also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879 (1963) (asserting that
free expression is essential to realizing the individual's character and potenti-
alities as a human being); see generally Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) (arguing that the true goal of free speech
is to promote "individual self-realization").
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a "free" decision in any meaningful sense.
Similarly, a communitarian theorist, at least a democratic
communitarian theorist,49 who presumably cares little about
negative effects on individual development, should find troubling
the potential impact of government-subsidy decisions on the
political and societal values fostered by free expression. A
democratic communitarian theorist values free expression
because it facilitates performance of the community's self-
governing function by providing the electorate with information
and opinion about the issues that require community de-
cisions.5" To the extent that government-subsidy decisions chill
expression, that chilling deprives the electorate of whatever
information or opinion speakers would have contributed but for
the government's decision. To the extent that subsidy decisions
cause individuals to assert viewpoints that they would not have
asserted of their own free will, they artificially skew the tenor
and direction of public debate. As a result, the possibility exists
that the government precluded information important to the
electorate from reaching that audience. The decision, therefore,
harms the public's decision-making process.5 Thus, whatever
one's broad perspective on the value of free expression, one can
perceive that linkage between government subsidies and either
the existence or content of expression presents, at least poten-
tially, a substantial threat to those values.
C. THE "JEKYLL-HYDE" NATURE OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES:
ACKNOWLEDGING THE FIRST AMENDMENT DILEMMA
On the basis of the analysis of the preceding sections, one
might face the temptation to conclude that any linkage of
government subsidies to protected expression" violates the
49. By"democratic communitarian," we mean one who believes in the value
of communitarian self-determination. See Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman,
Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional
Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REv. 267,290-94 (1991) (defining
the "communitarian-determinative" model of civic republican theory).
50. See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 47.
51. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The
Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 101 (1975)
(explaining that content-based restrictions distort the marketplace of ideas,
leaving the public with an incomplete and possibly inaccurate vision of society's
opinions).
52. To the extent the expression in question does not fall within First
Amendment protection and thus could be regulated directly, this analysis of
course becomes irrelevant.
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First Amendment, much as the imposition of a fine or a prison
sentence does. The issue, however, is considerably more
complex. In certain cases, not only do government subsidies of
expression not present the aforementioned dangers to First
Amendment interests, they affirmatively foster the values served
by free expression. For example, government's funding of the
arts or scientific research likely promotes both autonomy and
comimunitarian values. Although courts generally do not
construe the Constitution to impose on the government an
affirmative obligation to support individuals," surely it would
appear Orwellian to prohibit the government totally from
facilitating expression in the name of the First Amendment.
Both scholars and jurists, then, face the dilemma of fashioning
an analytical structure that will guide us in deciding when
government subsidy decisions overstep constitutional boundaries.
II. CALIBRATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZATION:
AN ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE
In shaping our approach, we initially draw a distinction
between "negative" subsidies and "positive" subsidies. A
negative subsidy conditions receipt on a potential speaker's
decision either to refuse to speak or to cease speaking. A
positive subsidy, on the other hand, requires the recipient to
engage in expression. Under our structure, negative subsidies
are presumptively unconstitutional. The structure finds them
constitutional only in those cases in which current First
Amendment jurisprudence would uphold an affirmative impo-
sition of a burden, such as when the government imposes a fine
or prison sentence for expression falling outside the scope of the
First Amendment,5 4 or when competing social interests out-
weigh the need for free expression." Analysis of positive
53. See DeShaneyv. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
195 (1989) (holding that the Constitution confers no right to affirmative aid).
54. An example is expression categorized as legally obscene. See Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-37 (1973) (holding, in part, that obscene material is
not protected by the First Amendment).
55. An example would be advocacy of unlawful conduct that is found to
present a clear and imminent danger of harm. See generally Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (explaining the level of imminent harm
necessary to justify an infringement of free speech protection).
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subsidies, on the other hand, requires a more detailed inquiry.5 6
B. NEGATIVE SUBSIDIES
With the philosophical foundations of the First Amendment's
protection of free expression in mind," one can see that nega-
tive subsidization of speech, such as the government's provision
of a subsidy to an individual on the condition that she remain
silent, constitutes a significant abridgement of free speech.
Negative subsidization of speech undermines the underpinnings
of both communitarian and autonomy theories of the First
Amendment. Under a communitarian view, negative subsidi-
zation reduces the sum total of speech available to contribute to
wise collective self-government and therefore impedes the
community's ability to govern itself. Similarly, under an
autonomy view, any government inducement not to speak
reduces not only the development of the speaker, but also that
of her would-be listeners, readers, or viewers.
Since negative subsidizations of speech undermine the
values served by the First Amendment, they are presumptively
unconstitutional. Indeed, negative subsidization of speech
closely resembles direct, content-based government restrictions
on speech, which are almost never constitutionally permis-
sible.5" For all the reasons that courts strictly scrutinize
content-based government restrictions on speech, so, too, should
56. See infra Part II.C. (discussing positive government subsidies ofspeech).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 46-52. (discussing the effects of
government subsidies on free speech).
58. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1975)
(holding invalid a statute prohibiting drive-in theaters from showing movies
containing nudity if screen is visible from a public street); Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,99-102 (1972) (declaring as overbroad a statute prohibiting
all picketing, other than peaceful picketing during a labor dispute, within 150
feet of a school). In both of these cases, the Court closely scrutinized content-
based regulations. For an overview of the treatment of content-based
restrictions, see generally John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the
Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1482 (1975); Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980); Stone, supra note 51.
Indeed, even if restrictions on speech are content-neutral, First Amendment
principles might be undermined. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Content
Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 131 (1981)
("[Sluch restrictions may undermine the functioning of the marketplace by
keeping the public equally ignorant of all positions on issues, rather than
merely of one viewpoint.").
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they subject negative subsidies to a presumption of unconstitu-
tionality.5 9
C. POSITIVE SUBSIDIES
It is tempting to argue that the government does not abridge
freedom of speech when it funds expression in a positive, rather
than a negative, manner. After all, as long as it does not impose
a penalty or otherwise discourage the exercise of free expression,
the government appears not to violate the First Amendment.
Unlike negative subsidies, positive subsidies do not reduce the
sum total of expression, and no one is placed in a better position
by not speaking. The speaker who is denied a positive subsidy
because her views differ from those of the government is placed
in no better position by saying nothing than by saying what she
had intended to say in the first place. Moreover, the government
is wholly neutral as to this speaker's initial choice whether to
speak or to remain silent. The government cares only what the
speaker will say if she does choose to speak.
The government's decision to subsidize an entity can
nevertheless amount to an abridgement of speech because such
a decision may artificially skew a public debate by inducing some
who otherwise would have taken a contrary position (or would
have chosen not to speak at all) to support the government's
views. Such a result undermines both the communitarian and
the autonomy values conceivably underlying the First Amend-
ment. The goal, therefore, is to construct an analytical structure
that allows the government to subsidize speech positively when
such subsidization promotes First Amendment values but
precludes the government from subsidizing speech positively
when such subsidization undermines these values.
1. The Costs and Benefits of Positive Government
Subsidization of Speech
To establish a structure for gauging the constitutionality of
positive government subsidization of speech, one must first
examine both the conceivable benefits and costs of such subsidi-
59. See Edward G. Reitler, The Title 'X Family Planning Subsidies: The
Government's Role in Moral Issues, 27 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 453, 459 (1990)
(refuting the argument that negative subsidies are far less insidious than direct
restrictions because an entity can simply reject a subsidy and therefore eschew
the silencing effect of that subsidy).
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zation.6 °  This examination confirms our contention that
positive subsidization of speech can both foster and undermine
First Amendment values.
a. The Benefits of Government Subsidization
A democratic society must permit the government on
occasion to communicate with the populace, both with its own
voice and through the voices of others.6 Commentators have
recognized that the government is uniquely situated to inform
directly and teach the populace.62 In addition, indirect govern-
ment subsidization of private speech can provide a voice to an
entity that, without the aid of government funding, would not be
heard.6"
60. Professor Yudof has noted that the benefits and costs of government
subsidization of speech, addressed briefly above and more fully below, apply
specifically to government subsidization of speech because [glovernments have
an almost unique capacity to acquire and disseminate information in the
modem state. This stems in part simply from superior resources ... [blut...
also stems from the broad reach of the modem welfare state." MARK G. YUDOF,
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN
AMERICA 9-10 (1983). Yudof believes that the potential harmful effects of this
capacity are exacerbated by technological advances that have improved the
government's ability to communicate. Id.
61. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) ("The State is
seeking to communicate to others an official view as to proper appreciation of
history, state pride, and individualism. Of course, the State may legitimately
pursue such interests in any number of ways."); JOSEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT
AND THE MIND 13-14 (1977) ("Even in democratic societies, the community may
legitimately act, through government, on the mind."); YUDOF, supra note 60, at
41 ("It is absurd, then, in the modem contexts, to adopt the position that
government speech, in its many manifestations and irrespective of its advan-
tages, is an illegitimate enterprise in a liberal and democratic state."); Donald
L. Beschle, Conditional Spending and the First Amendment: Maintaining the
Commitment to Rational Liberal Dialogue, 57 MO. L. REV. 1117 (1992)
(affirming the importance of the government's voice while exploring the current
approach to conditional-spending issues); Reitler, supra note 59, at 458 ("[T]he
question is no longer whether the government has any role in the inculcation
of values. Instead it is a matter of how much governmental influence in
individual choice is desirable.").
62. See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
63. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976) (per curiam)
(recognizing that public expenditures may "facilitate and enlarge public
discussion"); Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of
Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 868
(1979) ('The government is sometimes uniquely situated to acquire and
disseminate particular information, and in some cases government may be the
only actor with the willingness and the resources to present a particular side
of a public issue.").
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Professor Emerson noted that
[plarticipation by the government in the system of freedom of
expression is an essential feature of any democratic society. It enables
the government to inform, explain and persuade-measures especially
crucial in a society that attempts to govern itself with a minimum use
of force. Government participation also greatly enriches the system; it
provides the facts, ideas, and expertise not available from other
sources. In short, government expression is a necessary and healthy
part of the system.'
Perhaps the most zealous advocate in support of the
government's subsidization of speech in order to teach and
inform was Joseph Tussman, who argued "not only that
government has authority in the realm of the mind, but also that
its responsibilities there are among the most important that it
has."65 Tussman recognized that the government serves a
crucial function in supporting "knowledge-creating and transmit-
ting institutions,"6 and that "Ithe teaching power is the
inherent constitutional authority of the state to establish and
direct the teaching activity and institutions needed to ensure its
continuity and further its legitimate general and special
purposes." 7 Tussman argued that because the government
functions in part by teaching, persuading, and informing the
populace, it therefore must be able to subsidize speech.68
Similarly, Zachariah Chafee argued that the government must
be able to communicate with the public in order to explain
statutes and regulations promulgated by it,69 and must be able
to inform those governed of potential dangers to their well-
being.70
64. EMERSON, supra note 45, at 698.
65. TUSSMAN, supra note 61, at 3.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id. at 54.
68. See id. at 13-14; see also David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional
Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 702 (1992) ("[A] government functions in large measure
through communication and persuasion, and would be disabled by a mandate
that it maintain only neutral positions."); Yudof, supra note 63, at 866
("Although they do not serve individual values of self-expression and dignity,
the communications emanating from [the government, as well as municipal and
private corporations] do provide information necessary to the exercise of the
citizenry's judgment about political issues and candidates.").
69. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT & MASS COMMUNICATIONS 755
(1947).
70. Id. As an example of this principle in action, Chafee explained that "[i]f
the government makes [a serious public danger] plain to the people, they may
be able to ward it off by private action...." Id.
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In addition to directly teaching and informing the public,
government subsidization of speech can indirectly enable a
private individual or entity that would have difficulty being
heard without the government's assistance to speak, thereby
allowing that individual or entity to reach its intended audience.
Indeed, commentators have argued that "government speech
often offsets the vast communications resources controlled by
corporate or wealthy interests""' insofar as it "can amplify the
voices of the local populace that seek to participate in debates
dominated by mass institutions." 2
b. The Dangers of Government Subsidization
Countless commentators have expressed the fear that, by
positively subsidizing speech, the government might artificially
skew the debate on a particular issue and thereby artificially
shape public attitudes." Professor Yudof, for example, ex-
pressed concern over the government's ability to "shape public
attitudes" through communication. 4 "The obvious danger,"
Yudof asserted, "[was] that government persuaders [would] come
to disrespect citizens and their role of ultimate decider, and
manipulate them by communicating only what [made] them
accede to government's plans, policies, and goals." 5 Yudof
71. Reitler, supra note 59, at 483.
72. YUDOF, supra note 60, at 43; see also Yudof, supra note 63, at 866
(stating that government speech, which "can amplify the voices of individuals"
is one consideration for the support of "First Amendment rights for the
government").
73. See YUDOF, supra note 60, at 42 ('The power to teach, inform, and lead
is also the power to indoctrinate, distort judgment, and perpetuate the current
regime."); see also Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565,
611 (1980) (recognizing the danger of the tyranny of prevailing opinion).
74. YUDOF, supra note 60, at 6; see also Robert D. Kamenshine, The First
Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104,
1107 (1979) ("Government promulgation of political views presents dangers to
the interests which the Framers intended the first amendment to protect.");
Shiffrin, supra note 73, at 611 (arguing that government "departures from
neutrality are indefensible when they undermine respect for the democratic
process."); Yudof, supra note 63, at 898 (noting that, by "indoctrination and the
withholding of vital information," government speech can undermine "the power
of the citizenry to judge intelligently and to communicate those judgments").
But see generally Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35
STAN. L. REV. 373 (1983) (reviewing MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEAKS: POLITICs, LAw, AND GovERNMENT ExPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983))
(questioning the distorting effect of government speech).
75. YUDOF, supra note 60, at 6; see also Kamenshine, supra note 74, at 1105
("If a government can manipulate [the marketplace of ideas], it can ultimately
562
1996] GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES 563
expressed the fear that government communications might be
used to "falsify consent," that is, that the government would
"attempt to fashion a majority will through uncontrolled
indoctrination activities."76 Yudof believed that this eventuality
has become more likely as the "expansion of government at all
levels had increased its opportunity to communicate with the
populace."77
Professors Emerson and Haber concurred with Yudof:
The penetration of government into more and more aspects of modem
life, including the field of mass communication; the increasing
dependence of higher education and scientific research upon govern-
ment support; the many forms of pressure toward political, intellectual
and social conformity-these and other factors raise grave issues as to
the proper role of government in controlling communication and
molding thought and expression in a democratic society.7"
Perhaps the concerns of the aforementioned scholars were
most effectively summarized by Professor Robert Kamenshine,
who contended that "[tihe government has the potential to use
its unmatched arsenal of media resources and legislative
prerogatives to obtain political ends, to nullify the effectiveness
of criticism, and, thus, to undermine the principle of self-government."79
subvert the processes by which the people hold it accountable.").
76. YUDOF, supra note 60, at 15; see also Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Govern-
ment Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C.
L. REV. 578, 580 (1980).
77. YUDOF, supra note 60, at 6. More specifically, Yudof feared that the
government might manipulate the private mass media "by leaking selected
information, creating pseudo-events, and lying about matters not easily verified
by those outside government." Id. at 8. He also expressed concern about the
"tendency of executive-branch agencies to seek to influence legislative
processes." Id. Additionally, Yudof feared the government's ability to speak,
without limitation, in "public institutions whose mission, in whole or in part,
[was] to indoctrinate, educate, or care for a particular group." Id. at 9.
78. Thomas I. Emerson & David Haber, The "Scopes" Case in Modern Dress,
27 U. Cm. L. REV. 522, 522 (1960).
79. Kamenshine, supra note 74, at 1104; see also Shiffrin, supra note 73, at
607 ("If a system of free expression is to be preserved, either custom, or
statutes, or constitutionally based limitations must provide assurances that
government speech will not unfairly dominate the intellectual marketplace.");
Ziegler, supra note 76, at 618 (arguing that "official partisanship in connection
with structured political questions violates the first amendment since it
infringes the political rights of citizens by diminishing the effect and probability
of success of its opponents' protected expression"). The Supreme Court has
heeded these warnings in a number of cases. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 597-610 (1967) (holding that statute and regulations
preventing the appointment or retention of subversive persons in state
employment was unconstitutional).
Zechariah Chafee identified a particular concern with the government's
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2. Subdividing Positive Subsidies
When it positively subsidizes speech such that the hazards
of the government-sponsored communication outweigh its
benefits, the government improperly undermines First Amend-
ment values, and courts must deem the subsidization unconstitu-
tional. The obvious task, then, is to conceptualize and categorize
positive subsidies in a manner that enables a reviewing court to
distinguish the beneficial positive subsidies from the detrimental
ones with reasonable accuracy and efficiency. Recognizing the
need for such a dichotomy, of course, is considerably easier than
fashioning one.
With this admonition in mind, we divide the category of
positive subsidies into two broad subcategories: "policy" subsi-
dies, and "auxiliary" subsidies. Policy subsidies include funding
the speech of "core" government employees, for example, those
who are responsible for directing governmental policy,0 when
they engage in expression about and in support of government
activities and initiatives. We term this funding "limited
government employee subsidies." Policy subsidies also include
the selection of political appointees when decision-makers base
their selection at least in part on the viewpoints expressed by
the appointed individuals. We term these subsidies "appoint-
ment subsidies." Our approach presumptively deems both types
of policy subsidies constitutional. Auxiliary subsidies, to which
we will return below,8 consist of all positive government
subsidization of the expression of private individuals or entities,
except appointment subsidies, and subsidization of the speech of
non-core government employees.
ability to shape public attitudes. Chafee's apprehension was that those in power
would communicate with the public simply as a means for staying in power.
CHAFEE, supra note 69, at 763. He believed that "an energetic information
service [was] an excellent way [for officeholders] to intrench themselves in
office."Id.; see also Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 637 n.14 (Mass.
1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979) ("Surely, the Constitution of the
United States does not authorize the expenditure of public funds to promote the
reelection of the President, Congressmen, and State and local officials (to the
exclusion of their opponents), even though the open discussion of political
candidates and elections is basic First Amendment material."); Reitler, supra
note 59, at 456 ("elected officials should not perpetuate themselves or their
party through the spending of public monies").
80. Whether a particular employee falls within the category of "core"
employees presents an issue of fact, for individualized resolution.
81. See infra discussion at Part II.C.2.b.
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a. Policy Subsidies
i. Limited Government Employee Subsidies
The first type of policy subsidy is the limited government
employee subsidy, which our approach deems constitutional.
Society must permit government employees who participate in
directing governmental policy to speak, supported by government
funding, about and in favor of government policies and initia-
tives.8 2 From the perspective of democratic theory, it is es-
sential that these government employees inform the populace of
the government's policies and initiatives. Because the govern-
ment informs the populace about its functioning through these
subsidies, it facilitates self-government by providing members of
the community with information and data on which to judge the
performance of its political leaders. As a result, the electorate
is better able to check elected officials and hold them account-
able. 3
It is true that permitting core government employees to
speak on matters regarding the functioning of the government
creates a risk that the government is also able to skew artifi-
cially a debate and undercut First Amendment principles by
overwhelming the opposition due to the sheer volume of
government speech. The fact that listeners may readily identify
the government speaker as such, however, mitigates the
likelihood of this potentiality. As a result, the speech of a core
government employee is unlikely to skew substantially the
marketplace of ideas, since the populace can evaluate the
message with an eye toward the messenger.8 4 Any remaining
possibility that the government might undermine First Amend-
ment principles by skewing a debate with limited government
employee subsidies is substantially outweighed by the practical
and theoretical benefits that derive from allowing core govern-
ment employees to speak on issues of importance to the govern-
ment.
82. TUSSMAN, supra note 61, at 115.
83. See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL
STRUCTURE 154-58 (1995); Blasi, supra note 47, at 521.
84. See Beschle, supra note 61, at 1144 ("The government's disproportionate
power to communicate its opinions is at least partially curbed by the natural
skepticism, perhaps even cynicism, which greets government messages clearly
labeled as such."); Reitler, supra note 59, at 460 ("Today's Watergate-wise public
is notoriously skeptical of what its government says.").
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A classic example of a limited government employee subsidy
is government funding of the travels of the Vice President of the
United States in order to allow him to speak in favor of a policy
supported by the administration. Certainly the Constitution
permits Vice President Gore to travel the country, at govern-
ment expense, to speak in favor of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, even though the administration quite
naturally declines to fund the treaty's opponents. This type of
subsidization is constitutional because it ultimately fosters First
Amendment values.5
ii. Appointment Subsidies
Our approach also permits the government to make hiring
decisions of policy making, non-civil-service employees based on
the previously expressed viewpoints of the candidates it is
considering. Few would argue that the Constitution does not
permit the government to consider the writings, speeches, and
other public statements of a scholar in considering whether to
appoint that scholar to the cabinet. Precluding the government
from engaging in such a positive subsidization of speech could
result in the appointment of an individual whose ideas are
incompatible with those of the government. As a result,
prohibiting this positive subsidy would hinder elected govern-
ment officials in their efforts to implement the policy choices
they were presumably elected to bring to fruition. This would
undermine fundamental notions of representative democratic
theory.
We acknowledge that by permitting the government to
provide appointment subsidies, we potentially allow the govern-
ment artificially to skew debate. It is conceivable, we suppose,
that an individual might alter her expression in order to be
appointed to some position by the government. Despite this
possibility, considerations of governmental efficiency and
democratic theory"s lead us to conclude that appointment
subsidies, like limited government employee subsidies, are
constitutional.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 61-72 (arguing that certain
governmental subsidies support First Amendment values).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 61-72 (describing the benefits of
government subsidization).
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b. Auxiliary Subsidies
Auxiliary subsidies are positive subsidies that the govern-
ment grants to entities or individuals other than core govern-
ment employees and government appointees to encourage and
facilitate their expression. They include such subsidies as a
government grant to an organization to allow it to produce a
study examining the effects of smoking on human beings,
government funds given to a private library to purchase books,
and a government grant to support completion of a particular
artistic or literary work.
Under our approach, the government may constitutionally
provide auxiliary subsidies only in certain instances. Auxiliary
subsidies allow the government to teach, inform, or provide a
voice to a relatively silent entity, and therefore may promote
First Amendment values. Once again, however, allowing the
government to act as a benefactor to third parties creates the
danger that the government may skew artificially public debate
or impede an individual's exercise of free will in fashioning her
expression. What's more, auxiliary subsidies, unlike policy
subsidies, do not always assist the government in performing
essential functions. Therefore, our approach significantly
circumscribes, but does not entirely curtail, the government's
ability to disburse auxiliary subsidies.
We divide auxiliary subsidies into three, not entirely
segregated subcategories: "categorical" subsidies, "Viewpoint-
based" subsidies, and subsidies of "judgmental necessity." The
government provides categorical subsidies of speech when it
makes viewpoint-neutral choices to fund particular categories,
subjects, or classes of speech. The government generally makes
categorical subsidies both because of the public's need for
information and because such subsidization is unlikely to come
from other sources."' For example, the government makes a
categorical subsidy when it funds a study on the physical effects
of smoking, or the purchase of history books or new American
fiction for a public library. Our approach deems such subsidies
presumptively constitutional.
87. Owing to its substantial resources, the government is uniquely capable
of funding the promulgation of information on many matters of public concern.
See YUDOF, supra note 60 (describing the government's unique position to
provide subsidies).
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The government makes a viewpoint-based subsidy of speech
when it chooses to fund speakers based on their viewpoints. Our
approach deems these subsidies presumptively unconstitu-
tional.8" If we permit the government to make viewpoint-based
subsidies, the government could choose to fund only those
viewpoints with which it agreed, thereby dramatically skewing
public debate and undermining First Amendment principles.
The greatest fears attendant to government subsidization of
speech, therefore, derive from this kind of subsidy.
Before one can accept our model's proposed bar against
viewpoint-based positive auxiliary subsidies, we must answer
three questions: First, why are viewpoint-based auxiliary
subsidies more harmful to First Amendment values than
categorical auxiliary subsidies? Second, why does our proposed
structure deny government the power to do indirectly through
auxiliary subsidies, what it permits government to do directly
through policy subsidization of the expression of core govern-
ment employees and appointees? 9 Finally, even if one were to
accept as a theoretical matter the validity of a view-
point/categorical dichotomy for purposes of positive auxiliary
subsidies, how, as a practical matter, is a court to decide
whether a subsidy, labelled superficially as a categorical subsidy,
is in reality a disguised viewpoint subsidy?
Initially, the distinction our structure draws between
viewpoint-based and categorical subsidies represents a well
established precept of First Amendment doctrine in other areas
of speech regulation. ° While this dichotomy is by no means
free of risk in areas of direct governmental regulation,9 in the
context of government subsidies the justification for the dis-
tinction is compelling. In a case of direct governmental regu-
lation, it is difficult to understand why the fact that a prohi-
bition is categorically-based, rather than viewpoint-based,
88. It may not be presumptively constitutional, however, if the subsidy is
a policy subsidy or a subsidy of judgmental necessity that is inevitably
viewpoint based.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86 (discussing subsidization of
government employees and appointees).
90. See generally Stone, supra note 51 (explaining that content-based
restrictions distort the marketplace of ideas, leaving the public with an
incomplete and -possibly inaccurate vision of society).
91. Indeed, one of us has in the past been a severe critic of this dichotomy.
See generally Redish, supra note 58 (explaining that content-neutral restrictions
may negatively affect the marketplace of ideas).
568 [Vol. 80:543
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
somehow implies that the prohibition need not be subjected to a
compelling interest standard; the sum total of expression is
reduced as a result of the regulation in either case, and what-
ever values free speech protection serves are thereby harmed. 2
In the case of government subsidies, however, complete denial of
government power to subsidize speech has the effect not of
preserving expression, but of actually reducing the sum total of
expression. Thus, one interested in fostering First Amendment
values should be quite hesitant to deny such power to the
government.
It is also true that, although categorical regulations can be
harmful to First Amendment values, they surely are not as
harmful as viewpoint-based regulations." Categorical dis-
tinctions do not skew public debate in the same manner, nor do
they present as great a danger of stark governmental sup-
pression of political opinion, as do viewpoint-based regulations.
Thus, given the potentially beneficial impact of positive subsi-
dies, it is appropriate to draw a line that allows government to
subsidize speech in a categorical manner but simultaneously
denies it the power to subsidize on the basis of viewpoint.
It is true that under our approach, government is permitted
to subsidize the speech of core policy employees on a viewpoint
basis.94 The justification for such subsidies, however, is consid-
erably stronger than the asserted justification for viewpoint-
based auxiliary subsidies, and the risk of harm is simultaneously
considerably less than the potential harm caused by viewpoint-
based auxiliary subsidies. Initially, it is difficult to imagine how
government could operate effectively without having the
opportunity to communicate its positions and programs to the
public, or without the opportunity to select its policy-making
employees on the basis of their previously expressed viewpoints.
It is equally difficult to understand why efficient representative
government somehow requires the opportunity to control the
flow of debate among private parties through the selective use
of viewpoint-based subsidies. At least as a general matter,95
92. See id. (explaining that content-neutral regulations also may undermine
First Amendment principles).
93. See generally Stone, supra note 51 (discussing the dangers of viewpoint-
based discrimination).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86 (describing the benefits of
subsidizing speech of policy-making employees).
95. It is conceivable that under narrowly defined circumstances, govern-
ment may find it necessary to "farm out" one of its traditional policy expressions
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government should be able to operate effectively without the
need to "deputize" private parties to foster government views
and positions.
Moreover, auxiliary viewpoint-based subsidies to private
parties present a danger of defrauding the public in a manner
not present in the case of policy subsidies. When a government
officer speaks, much as when a political candidate or a com-
mercial advertiser speaks, the listener is able to "discount" the
expression on the basis of the speaker's apparent self-interest."
However, when government fosters dissemination of its positions
by means of funding private party expression, the danger arises
that the public will fail to "discount" the views expressed. Even
if it were somehow feasible to require the private parties to
identify the existence of their government finding, the risk of
"consumer confusion" of partially attentive members of the
public is very real. Thus, drawing a distinction between
auxiliary viewpoint-based subsidies and policy subsidies makes
perfect sense from the perspective of both free speech theory and
the practical needs of governmental operations.
One must concede that government may on occasion seek to
disguise what are in reality viewpoint-based subsidies behind the
mask of permissible categorical subsidies. This problem has long
plagued the doctrinal distinction between viewpoint-based and
content-neutral regulations of expression. Although this danger
is impossible to avoid completely, at least two tactics can
mitigate the likelihood of its arising. Initially, courts must
prohibit the government from defining categorical subsidies in
a viewpoint laden manner, such that the very contours of the
category effectively exclude viewpoints with which government
disagrees. For example, government cannot define the category
as "the evils of abortion," thereby effectively excluding any
expression that advocates freedom of choice. A reviewing court
generally should be in a position to resolve this issue on the four
corners of the governmentally established category, without the
to a private contractor, as when government retains a private public relations
firm to fashion a campaign in support of a government program. Arguably, the
hypothetical of the private printer of the Congressional Record, supra text
following note 3, would fit within this category. Such activity may properly be
deemed a "policy" subsidy only in those instances in which a reviewing court
concludes that the expressive activity in question is one that, absent use of the
private contractor, the government definitely would have performed itself.
96. See supra text accompanying note 76 (discussing dangers of governmen-
tal falsification of consent).
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need to resort to a separate factual inquiry.
In certain situations, however, courts must still undertake
a separate factual inquiry. Such a case would arise when,
although on its face the categorical description unambiguously
excludes viewpoint distinctions, an unsuccessful applicant for the
subsidy asserts that in reality the government based its denial
on the applicant's underlying viewpoint. For example, assume
that the government chooses to fund studies on the presumably
viewpoint-neutral category of the social effects of abortion. An
unsuccessful applicant, however, claims that the government
based its denial of his application entirely or predominantly on
the fact that he intended to describe those social effects as
positive.
Under our approach, in order to challenge a facially
"neutral" funding decision as viewpoint-based, a plaintiff must
follow the procedure set out by the Supreme Court in Mt.
Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle.97 This procedure dictates
that the entity challenging the funding decision must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the government
impermissibly based its decision on the recipient's viewpoint."
The burden then shifts to the government to show by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that it would have reached the same
funding decision absent the viewpoint-based consideration.99
If the government fails to meet this burden, the challenged
decision fails. One cannot doubt that this procedure is costly.
It is likely that some number of viewpoint-based subsidies will
go unchallenged because of the transaction costs that inevitably
accompany litigation. Even with these costs in mind, however,
the Mt. Healthy procedure adequately protects against the
hazards of surreptitious viewpoint-based government subsidi-
zation.
97. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In that case, a fired, untenured teacher challenged
dismissal on First Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court initially required
the plaintiff to establish that his constitutionally protected conduct had been a
"substantial factor" in the school board's decision. Id. at 287. The burden then
shifted to the school board to demonstrate "by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have reached the same decision as to [the teacher's] reemployment
even in the absence of the protected conduct." Id. Although the Court did not
elaborate on exactly how this was to be accomplished, the only conceivable
method available to the board appears to have been to demonstrate the
inadequacy of the teacher's record and performance. The Court elaborated upon
this procedure in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
98. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
99. Id.
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c. Subsidies of Judgmental Necessity
Once the government makes the decision to award a
categorical subsidy, it naturally must choose among different
candidates for funding within that category. For example, once
the government decides to fund a study on breast cancer, it must
choose either Firm X or Firm Y to undertake the study. In
making this funding choice, we cannot require the government
arbitrarily to pick names out of a hat. Rationality requires that
the government examine and judge the content of the various
competing applications or proposals. Thus, while we can require
the government to eschew virtually all viewpoint-based factors
in the initial establishment of its subsidized categories, 100 we
cannot entirely preclude the influence of normative value
judgments in the actual selection among competing applicants
for the subsidy.
It would be unwise to conclude that, as a result of these
dangers, we should constitutionally deny government the
opportunity to provide positive auxiliary subsidies. The general
societal and First Amendment values served by such subsidies
are simply too great. 10' The task, then, is to engage in a form
of constitutional damage control. We probably cannot avoid all
dangers of abuse. We can, however, fashion certain flexible and
comprehensible ex ante guidelines that enable a reviewing court
to determine whether the substantive normative criteria
employed by government officials in selecting among competing
applicants are unconstitutional.
Under our structure, the government's selection is constitu-
tional as long as it is based on criteria "substantially related" to
the predescribed goals and purposes of the program pursuant to
which the category of speech is funded. For example, if the
government chooses to award a categorical subsidy to fund a
study on breast cancer, the government may make the choice
among competing applicants, provided that it bases its decision
on criteria "substantially related" to the prescribed purposes of
the funded program. Assuming that the government's program
is designed to fund the study that will produce the most
thorough, accurate, and reliable results, it may choose to fund
100. See supra text accompanying notes 90-99 (discussing prohibitions on
viewpoint-based subsidies).
101. See supra text accompanying note 61-72 (describing the public's need
for information).
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one firm's research to the exclusion of another's if it finds that
the former firm's study is more likely to meet these predeter-
mined criteria. Thus, the government may fund Firm X's study
to the exclusion of Firm Y's because it concludes that the former
will employ superior or more advanced technology or because its
primary researchers are better qualified. The government may
not fund Firm X's study to the exclusion of Firm Y's because
Firm Y is comprised of a higher percentage of Democrats than
Firm X. The political leanings of the members of the firm are
unrelated to the stated scope of the program for which the
subsidy is provided.
This requirement of "substantial relationship," coupled with
the requirement that the category of subsidized expression itself
be defined in a viewpoint-neutral manner,102 ensures, to the
highest degree possible, that the government does not in reality
engage in viewpoint-based subsidization when it makes subsidies
of judgmental necessity. This, in turn, precludes the government
from undermining First Amendment values by means of
viewpoint-based subsidies. 3
III. APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE
The preceding discussion described the elements of our
structure in abstract terms. Because difficulties naturally will
arise in application of the structure to specific fact situations, we
find it helpful to consider how the structure operates in real
circumstances. This section, therefore, examines the use of the
approach in three highly controversial cases of government
subsidization: federal funding of family planning programs,
governmental subsidization of the arts, and government selection
of public school textbooks.
A. FEDERAL FUNDING OF FAMILY-PLANNING PROGRAMS:
RUST V. SULLIVAN REVISITED
In Rust v. Sullivan,' the Supreme Court upheld Health
and Human Services Department (HHS) regulations regarding
federal funding of family-planning services promulgated
102. See supra text following note 96 (requiring that categories be fashioned
in a viewpoint neutral manner).
103. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits
and need for government subsidies).
104. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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pursuant to Title X of the Public Health Services Act.' Ac-
cording to the Act, the Secretary of HIIHS was directed to
promulgate regulations, pursuant to which she would make
grants and contracts.' °6 In 1988, the Secretary promulgated
the regulations in question. As the Supreme Court indicated,
these regulations "attach[ed] three principal conditions on the
grant of federal funds for Title X projects."107 First, the regula-
tions prohibited a Title X clinic from providing "counseling
concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning or
[from] provid[ing] referral for abortion as a method of family
planning."' ° Second, the regulations prohibited a Title X
project from "encourag[ing], promot[ing], or advocat[ing] abortion
as a method of family planning."' °9 Finally, the regulations re-
quired that a Title X project be organized in such a way that "it
[was] physically and financially separate" from activities
prohibited in the regulations."' By means of the new regula-
tions, the Secretary attempted to erect "a wall of separation
between Title X programs and abortion as a method of family
planning.""'
In concluding that the regulations were constitutional, the
Court relied heavily on its interpretation of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. The petitioners had argued that "the
restrictions on the subsidization of abortion-related speech
contained in the regulations [were] impermissible because they
condition[ed] the receipt of a benefit.., on the relinquishment
of a constitutional right, the right to engage in abortion advocacy
and counselling.""' The argument did not persuade the
majority. Rather, the majority concluded that the government
was not "denying a benefit to anyone, but [was] instead simply
insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which
105. 42 U.S.C. § 300-300a-7 (1988). Under Title X, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services was "authorized to make grants to and enter into contracts
with public or nonprofit private entities to assist in the establishment and
operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall offer a broad range
of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services." 42 U.S.C.
§ 300(a) (1988).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-4(a) (1988).
107. Rust, 500 U.S. at 179.
108. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1994).
109. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10 (1994).
110. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1994).
111. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (1988).
112. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.
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they were authorized.""' The Court found that
the regulations govern the scope of the Title X project's activities, and
leave the grantee unfettered in its other activities. The Title Xgrantee
can continue to perform abortions, provide abortion-related services,
and engage in abortion advocacy; it simply is required to conduct those
activities through programs that are separate and independent from
the project that receives Title X funds.'
The Court concluded that since the regulations placed a
condition on the program pursuant to which funds were received,
and not on the grantee receiving the funding, the condition was
not an unconstitutional condition. In other words, because the
regulations did not dictate what a Title X grantee could do
outside the boundaries of the Title X program, the regulations
were constitutional.
Viewed from the perspective of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, the Court's analysis possesses a superficial
appeal. But closer examination reveals the conceptual limi-
tations of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 15 more than
it demonstrates the correctness of the Court's decision. The
Court properly reasoned that in order to violate the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine, the government must link the receipt
of a subsidy either to the recipient's assumption or avoidance of
a particular viewpoint. The Court, however, viewed the
Secretary's regulations not as constituting subsidies forcing the
recipient's assumption or rejection of a particular viewpoint, but
rather as the very structural description of the scope and
purpose of the subsidy. The government established the subsidy
for the very purpose of fostering family planning methods other
than abortion. It therefore would be absurd to hold unconstitu-
tional the government's choice not to fund pro-abortion counsel-
ing. Thus, in the Court's view, the regulations constituted not
an improper government "carrot" designed to silence expression
of a particular viewpoint, but rather a self-defined governmental
program the purpose of which was to deter abortions, or at least
promote alternatives to abortion.
The problem with the unconstitutional conditions analysis
is that it allows the government to define its subsidization
113. Id. Indeed, elsewhere in the opinion, the Court asserted that "when the
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to
define the limits of that program." Id. at 194.
114. Id. at 196 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989)) (emphasis in original).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 20-36 (discussing the theoretical
limitations of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
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programs in a wholly unchecked, self-referential" 6 man-
ner. 7 Although such an analysis can enable the government
to escape the conceptual strictures imposed by the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine, its failure to view the government's
initial funding choice itself from the perspective of First
Amendment restraints enables the government to employ
subsidies in a manner that threatens core values of free
expression.
Viewed from the perspective of our proposed analytical
structure, the Secretary's regulations are clearly unconstitu-
tional. It is true that, from its inception, the funding program
had as its primary purpose the dissemination of information
about alternatives to abortion. Although the contours of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine allow the Court to satisfy
the constitutional inquiry without questioning the legitimacy of
the goals of the government's program, our structure, premised
exclusively on considerations unique to First Amendment policy
and theory, does not. For reasons we have discussed,"18 the
First Amendment cannot allow government to employ subsidies
as a means of skewing the expression of private parties. The
regulations at issue in Rust established a positive auxiliary
viewpoint-based subsidy, which is unconstitutional under our
116. "Self-referentiality" in this context refers to the evaluation of a
governmental subsidy with reference to the subsidy's express purpose rather
than to the effects the subsidy has on the wider sphere of available public
choices in regard to expression. See supra discussion at text between notes 96-
97.
117. The Court relied upon a logical fallacy when reasoning that
[tihe Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative
program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so
doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint;
it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.
Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (emphasis added). The Court erroneously believed that
"the government may'make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion,
and.., implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.'" Id. at 192-
93 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)). When, as here, the
government's "value judgment" is a pretext for stifling expression of an
ideological position, the government discriminates on the basis of viewpoint. As
Justice Blackmun indicated, the Court "for the first time" in Rust upheld "view-
point-based suppression of speech simply because that suppression was a
condition upon the acceptance of public funds." 500 U.S. at 207 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97 (analyzing the dangers of the
government's subsidization of speech). See also supra Part II.C.2.b. (discussing
the constitutional legitimacy of "auxiliary" subsidies).
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structure."9 The very description of the subsidy program as a
means of disseminating information concerning family planning
methods other than abortion inescapably reveals the viewpoint-
based, selective nature of the subsidy,2 ° and makes the pro-
gram unconstitutional under our approach. 121
The fallacy of the Rust Court's self-referential approach to
government subsidization programs becomes clear if one
visualizes the subsidization of private expression exclusively in
favor of such ideas as a free-market economic philosophy, or the
political theories of Mao Zedong or Rush Limbaugh. In such
situations, the Court could reason under its unconstitutional
conditions approach, as it did in Rust, that exclusion of funding
for those opposed to the political viewpoints sought to be
disseminated makes perfect sense in light of the program's own
purposive description. It does not follow, however, that such
initial decisions as to scope are themselves constitutional. Our
structure demonstrates that they are not.
Government may appropriately choose neutrally to fund
works on family planning, on the viability of free-market
economic philosophy, or on the wisdom of Mao Zedong's or Rush
Limbaugh's political thought. Each of these subsidies would
foster First Amendment values by adding to the public's
knowledge and facilitating the self-realization of those engaged
in the particular expressive activities and those listening or
watching them also. For reasons already discussed, however,
government may not foster public acceptance of its own view-
points on these issues by manipulating private expression.
B. GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZATION OF THE ARTS
Professor Robert O'Neil has posed the crucial dilemma
created by governmental subsidization of the arts:
[I]f government cannot fid all artists or all works, how must it
choose? If it makes choices, it must adopt and apply standards. And
if those standards are not simply broad and bland categories-for
example, fund only oil paintings but not water colors... -then there
119. See supra discussion at text accompanying note 88 (discussing the
constitutional legitimacy of viewpoint-based subsidies).
120. To underscore the viewpoint-based nature of the regulations, it is
helpful to transform them hypothetically into a proper categorical subsidy. This
would have been the case had the regulations directed the subsidized clinics to
counsel on the general issue of family planning.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97 (arguing that government may
not establish viewpoint-based categories).
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is inevitable potential for content differentiation. The difficulty is
deciding when that differentiation abridges or inhibits freedom of
expression in ways the first amendment will not allow."
Indeed, while few would argue that the government is not
constitutionally permitted to fund works of art," much dis-
agreement has arisen over the way in which the government
may constitutionally make its funding decisions."
In part to answer this question, Congress in 1965 estab-
lished the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA),'25 which
it designed as a mechanism for funding the "best" works of art
from the many for which artists had requested grants. Congress
intended that the choice be "insulated from partisan political
122. Robert M. O'Neil, Artistic Freedom and Academic Freedom, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 191 (1990).
123. But see generally EDWARb C. BANFIELD, THE DEMOCRATIC MUSE: VISUAL
ARTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1984) (arguing that the federal government
should not engage in the aesthetic judgments required for art subsidies);
WILLIAM D. GRAMPP, PRICING THE PRICELESS: ART, ARTISTS, AND ECONOMICS
(1989) (arguing that public support of the arts is not economically justifiable).
124. See generally Elizabeth E. deGrazia, In Search of Artistic Excellence:
Structural Reform of the National Endowment for the Arts, 12 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 133 (1994) (advocating a return to NEA decision-making free from
government-imposed content restrictions); Owen Fiss, State Activism and State
Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087 (1991) (equating viewpoint-based denial of
funding with government censorship of the arts); John E. Frohnmayer, Giving
Offense, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 1 (1993/1994) (arguing that, if the government
supports the arts at all, such support should be viewpoint-neutral); Donald W.
Hawthorne, Subversive Subsidization: How NEA Art Funding Abridges Private
Speech, 40 KAN. L. REV. 437 (1992) (arguing that NEA criteria are impermis-
sible under the First Amendment); Jesse Helms, Is it Art or Tax-Paid Ob-
scenity? The NEA Controversy, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 99 (1994) (explaining Senator
Helms's position that the NEA has been a tool for advancing moral relativism
more than a legitimate public subsidy); Stanley Ingber, Judging Without
Judgment: Constitutional Irrelevancies and the Demise of Dialogue, 46 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1473 (1994) (arguing that the Court unjustifiably has diminished
incentives for constitutionally contemplated public discourse); O'Neil, supra note
122 (discussing concepts of academic and artistic freedom); Amy Sabrin,
Thinking About Content: Can It Play an Appropriate Role in Government
Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE L.J. 1209 (1993) (arguing for a more precise
definition of artistic "content" in First Amendment jurisprudence); Carl F.
Stychin, Identities, Sexualities, and the Postmodern Subject: An Analysis of
Artistic Funding by the National Endowment for the Arts, 12 CARDOzO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 79 (1994) (arguing that restrictions on art funding are unconstitu-
tional because such restrictions deny some individuals a right to express a
political identity); Note, Standards for Federal Funding of the Arts: Free
Expression and Political Control, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1969 (1990) (arguing
against attempting to regulate art through conditional grants).
125. See deGrazia, supra note 124, at 133 (describing the formation of the
NEA).
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considerations."'26 Only artwork of "substantial artistic and
cultural significance" would receive funding.
127
Legislators have, at times, attempted to narrow the
definition of "best" by defining out of consideration specified
types of art. For example, in 1990, the NEA's reauthorization
bill contained what became known as the "decency clause.""
Under that clause, the NEA chairperson was directed to ensure
that all works funded by the NEA comported with "general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and
values of the American public."'29 The question is whether
attempts to make content-based distinctions among works of art,
such as the "decency" clause, are constitutionally permissible.
Determining the constitutionality of the decency clause
probably presents the most difficult test for our approach. 3 °
At least in the abstract, government is entitled to fund the arts.
Such a subsidy constitutes a positive auxiliary categorical
subsidy.'' Within this categorical subsidy, pursuant to the
principle of "judgmental necessity,"13 2 the government may
make content-based distinctions. In other words, the govern-
ment cannot be expected either to fund every one of the appli-
cants for funding or to make its selections arbitrarily. As
discussed in the analysis of our structure, the choice of one
applicant over another is properly deemed a constitutional
subsidy of judgmental necessity if it is based on criteria "sub-
stantially related" to the program pursuant to which the
category of speech is funded.'33 Thus, since by creating the
NEA Congress intended to fund on the basis of artistic excel-
126. Note, supra note 124, at 1972.
127. 20 U.S.C. § 954(c)(1) (1990).
128. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1990) (disallowing funding for any art the NEA
chairperson deems to be obscene).
129. Id. A California district court struck down the "decency clause" in
Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
In Finley, the court labelled the decency clause unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. In holding the clause was overbroad, the court concluded that the
government's criteria for evaluating art are limited to "professional evaluations
of... merit." Id. at 1475.
130. See supra Part H.C.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 87-97 (defining and discussing the
constitutionality of "auxiliary" subsidies).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 100-103 (discussing the application
of the "judgmental necessity" principle).
133. See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text (defining the
"substantial relationship" concept in the context of the normative selection
process).
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lence, it may choose between applications only by means of
criteria designed to determine excellence.
There appears to be no basis on which a reviewing court
could objectively determine that considerations of "decency" are
inherently unrelated to the quality of the art. To be sure, one
could quite reasonably argue that such considerations should be
deemed to have no connection to quality. This, however, seems
to be a purely subjective judgment, one which a court has no
more ability to make than it does the initial quality determi-
nation. As a result, if a particular applicant is denied on the
grounds that his art is gross or offensive, it would be effectively
impossible for a reviewing court to conclude, for constitutional
purposes, that such a judgment was substantially unrelated to
the work's artistic quality.
Arguably, a different situation is presented when, rather
than influencing a determination of whether particular artwork
meets standards of excellence, decency considerations are
employed, ex ante, to exclude entire categories of work that deal
with certain subjects or employ certain words or visual images.
In such a case, those in authority could be making a good faith,
broadly based judgment concerning artistic quality. A reviewing
court, however, could reasonably be suspicious of any such
mechanistic approach. We doubt that true artistic judgments
could be so broadly and crudely made. It is considerably more
likely in such a case that those in power are superimposing on
to the selection process normative content-based judgments that
are wholly unrelated to considerations of quality. This likelihood
is even greater when this a priori decency limitation is imposed,
not by those experts designated to make the individual funding
selections, but by Congress itself. While it is of course difficult
and dangerous for a reviewing court to question asserted
congressional motivations,1  in such a situation a court could
properly conclude, as a matter of law, that Congress's concern is
not with issues of artistic quality, but with wholly extraneous
normative moral, social, and lifestyle judgments.'35  The
134. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1968)
(accepting at face value Congress's highly suspect assertion that its prohibition
on draft and desecration was motivated by viewpoint-neutral, non-speech
related considerations). See also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 819 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the Court's avoidance of a congressional-
motive inquiry in O'Brien).
135. Nor could Congress redefine its goal as the funding of "decent" art. See
supra text accompanying notes 73-79 (discussing the dangers inherent in
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decency clause, in that case, would not qualify under the
"judgmental necessity" exception, because the criteria employed
to make the choice are not "substantially related" to the
legitimate viewpoint-neutral parameters of the subsidy program.
One might respond that Congress should not be forced to
fund expression with which its members or those they represent
disagree or find morally repugnant, and of course, Congress
cannot be forced to do so. Congress could conceivably make the
judgment that it will fund absolutely no art. It does not follow,
however, for reasons already discussed," 6 that it may choose
indirectly to manipulate both public opinion and private speech
through the use of viewpoint-based auxiliary subsidies.
C. SELECTING PUBLIC SCHOOL TEXTS
Public schools give rise to a unique First Amendment
conundrum. On the one hand, public schools play an important,
indeed vital, role in socializing and inculcating values in
students. 137 On the other hand, government, in its efforts to
governmentally sanctioned positive-speech subsidies).
136. See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 88-96 (arguing that
viewpoint-based subsidies are unconstitutional).
137. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (arguing that
"schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized order"); Plyer
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 n.20 (1982) ("The public schools are an important
socializing institution, imparting those shared values through which social order
and stability are maintained."); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)
(discussing findings that public schools instill "fundamental values necessary
to the maintenance of a democratic political system"); West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) (finding that the government can
teach "the guaranties of civil liberty which tend to inspire patriotism and love
of country"); Joel S. Moskowitz, The Making of the Moral Child: Legal
Implications of Values Education, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 105, 134-36 (1978) (asserting
that the state has a compelling interest in inculcating values to students);
Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual
Development, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1274 (1991) ("The Supreme Court currently
views the work of the schools to be the inculcation of values."); Mark G. Yudof,
Library Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean
Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527, 527-28 (1984) ("Children, however, are rightfully
perceived as ... instruments of larger societal purposes. Those purposes
include the assimilation of the child into the larger culture, for the
intergenerational, exogenetic transmission of values, knowledge, language, and
customs is essential to the preservation of community and to the definition of
persons within the community."); William B. Senhauser, Note, Education and
the Court: The Supreme Court's Educational Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REV. 939,
943-44 (1987) (stating that under the "cultural transmission ideology... the
purpose of education is not to encourage individual growth, but to assure the
internalization of established norms, with the child's need to learn societal
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socialize and inculcate, "may cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom," thereby undermining the First Amendment rights of
students. 38 Commentators often argue that the role of the
school as indoctrinator and the First Amendment rights of the
students are in direct conflict.'39 As a result of this conflict,
the right of the school to indoctrinate often tramples the First
Amendment rights of students.'4 °
disciplines receiving particular emphasis").
138. Keyishian v. Board of Educ., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (noting that
students are not "closed-circuit recipients of only that which the state chooses
to communicate"); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. at 637 (stating
that schools "are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of [c]onstitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle
the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of
our government as mere platitudes"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925) (noting that students are not "mere creatures of the state"); STEPHEN
ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING 206 (1983)
("If the government were able to use schooling to regulate the development of
ideas and opinions by controlling the transmission of culture and the sociali-
zation of children, freedom of expression would become a meaningless right.
.. "); Stephen E. Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism: The Constitutionality of
'Bending" History in Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 497, 498
(1987) (Indoctrination "may deny students an appreciation of the role that
liberty, democracy and dissent have played in our achievements as a people."
(citations omitted)); Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall
of Orthodoxy": Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 16
("Any effort to indoctrinate 'official values'.., is inconsistent with... personal
autonomy.").
139. See Ingber, supra note 138, at 19 ("Paradoxically, education must
promote autonomy while simultaneously denying it by shaping and constraining
present and future choices."); Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship:
The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95
YALE L.J. 1647, 1649 (1986) ("[Tlhe very nature of the process of inculcating
values in those who are not yet adults apparently necessitates that the
constitutional rights of... students be somewhat circumscribed."); Roe, supra
note 137, at 1276 ("An inherent conflict between the authority of the state to
instill knowledge and values it deems important and the speech interests of
individual students characterizes Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of
school speech."); Yudof, supra note 137, at 528 ("Children need to be socialized
to societal norms, but they also need to grow up to be relatively autonomous
beings within the confines of culture.").
140. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (holding that although students do not
"shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate, . . . [the] special
characteristics of the school environment" reduce students' First Amendment
protection); Levin, supra note 139, at 1678 ("In most instances, the interest of
the educational enterprise in socializing students to particular values or in
order and control is given considerable weight while that of the individual
schoolchild is given relatively little."); Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitu-
tional Limits on Government Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEx. L. REV. 197,
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How is one to negotiate the conflict between the rights of
government as indoctrinator in public schools and the rights of
students as autonomous human beings? A number of scholars
have addressed this question. Professors Yudof and Ingber
argue that the Supreme Court's inability to resolve this conflict
makes clear that the primary restraints on the government as
indoctrinator in the public schools must be "political, social, and
attitudinal."'4 ' Other scholars take a stronger position against
governmental indoctrination in the public schools, arguing that
society has no legitimate interest in inculcating students. Some
of these scholars argue that attempting to inculcate "political
values" is inappropriate because there are no "uniformly
acceptable" political values.'42 Others argue that attempting
to indoctrinate students is inappropriate generally because the
government is so ineffective at inculcating that which it seeks
(or ought to seek) to inculcate that it has no compelling interest
to justify its attempts to indoctrinate students.' A number
of these scholars have advocated adoption of a "fairness doctrine"
in public schools.' Such a doctrine would require "that
schools expose students to different viewpoints on controversial
issues."'45
Perhaps the clearest area of conflict in public schools exists
in the selection of history textbooks. Commentators have noted
that the purpose of history texts is "not to explore but to
instruct-to tell children what their elders want them to know
239-40 (1983) ("For many years, the Supreme Court has shown ambivalence
toward whether pupils in the public schools enjoy a right of freedom of belief
that serves as a check on governmental efforts to indoctrinate them.").
141. Ingber, supra note 138, at 95; Yudof, supra note 137, at 563; see also
Shiffrin, supra note 73, at 647-53 (arguing for a similarly "process oriented"
solution to the conflict that would divide the authority to make curriculum-
related decisions among schoolboards, parents and teachers).
142. See Kamenshine, supra note 74, at 1134 ("Short of general concepts of
social responsibility... no such [uniform] values exist.").
143. See Roe, supra note 137, at 1292-93 (advocating the use of a "conceptual
development model"); van Geel, supra note 140, at 297 ("Empirical social science
evidence shows that the government has no compelling interest in value
inculcation. .. ").
144. See, e.g., Emerson & Haber, supra note 78, at 526-28 (discussing the
need for a "balanced presentation" of views in public education); Gottlieb, supra
note 138, at 577 (detailing advantages to a fairness doctrinal approach in public
education); Kamenshine, supra note 74, at 1130, 1137 (discussing application
of a fairness doctrine); van Geel, supra note 140, at 297 (advocating the
adoption of a "fairness principle").
145. Gottleib, supra note 138, at 577.
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about their country.""4  Two studies of American textbooks
have confirmed this view, concluding that textbooks generally
"minimize the role of dissent in our history."47 This likely
stems from the "elders'" desires that their children not be made
fully aware of the potential effectiveness of dissent. Is such a
presentation of history constitutionally permissible? That is,
may a school board select a textbook although in doing so, it
inaccurately minimizes the role of dissent in our history?
Two points are particularly relevant to this question. First,
it is unlikely that a "definitive historical account" exists. It is
almost impossible, therefore, to choose the "best" textbook if to
do so is to choose the textbook that objectively contains the
"correct" account of history. Rather, selecting the "best" textbook
more likely means selecting the textbook that best accords with
the view of history espoused by those charged with selecting
texts. Second, in selecting a textbook, a school board need not
merely select the best transmitter of facts. Rather, as the
Supreme Court and many commentators have recognized, the
Constitution permits a school board, within certain boundaries,
to attempt to inculcate values in its students. 4 ' Some of this
inculcation appropriately occurs through textbooks selected by
the school board.
With these points in mind, we now return to the question of
what factors our structure indicates a school board may properly
consider in selecting a history textbook. Consider the hypotheti-
cal case of a school board that determines it will select only a
textbook that portrays history as accurately as possible.
Moreover, the school board believes accuracy requires that
Christopher Columbus be portrayed as a racist. Although the
text might tell of Columbus's arrival in North America, it must
also tell of his allegedly savage treatment of Native Americans.
146. FRANCES FITZGERALD, AMERICA REVISED: HISTORY SCHOOLBOOKS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 47 (1979).
147. Gottleib, supra note 138, at 505; see also James C. O'Brien, Note, The
Promise of Pico:A New Definition of Orthodoxy, 97 YALE L.J. 1805, 1820 (1988)
.(citing Jean Anyon, Workers, Labor and Economic History, and Textbook
Content, in IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN SCHOOLING 37,44 (Michael W. Apple &
Lois Weis eds., 1983)) ("Anyon found that radical unions, their leaders, and
their policies were ignored, insulted, or dismissed as dishonest... [and] that
[textbooks] discussed only strikes that ended in violence and ultimately did not
get workers what they wanted; and that reformist leaders and moderate reform
legislation were lauded." (citations omitted)).
148. See supra note 137.
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Our structure indicates that the school board may employ such
selection criteria.
In deciding to purchase accurate textbooks in the first
instance, the government makes a viewpoint-neutral choice to
fund a particular study or class of speech, a constitutionally
valid categorical subsidy. Within this category of speech, a
school board must of course select one textbook for use in its
schools. Under our approach, the board's choice falls within the
"judgmental necessity" exception, as long as it makes that choice
on the basis of criteria "substantially related" to the predescribed
purpose of the program pursuant to which textbooks are funded.
The job of the school board, presumably, is to select the textbook
that will provide students with the most complete and accurate
description and understanding of history. If a school board
believes that Christopher Columbus was a racist, then it is likely
that, all other things being equal, this school board will choose
a textbook that describes Columbus as a racist over one that
ignores his treatment of Native Americans. Insofar as subjective
viewpoint is inextricably linked to the board's judgment of
textbook quality, it is difficult to argue that a school board
cannot make the decision based on the textbooks' treatment of
Columbus. 4 9
The more troubling situation concerns a case in which the
school board selects a textbook that it openly believes to be
inferior in its picture of history but superior insofar as it
inculcates values that the school board desires to inculcate.
While inculcation of values is an inescapable function of the
149. Recall that the "judgmental necessity" concept allows the government
to have some basis on which to select between competing applicants for funding.
As long as the criteria used for selection are "substantially related" to the terms
of the viewpoint-neutral category, the government can make a normative
judgment between competitive candidates, even though this most likely will
produce "viewpoint" contamination. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying
text (discussing 'judgmental necessity"). Compare this with Rust v: Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991). In Rust, the government did not define the initial category
in a viewpoint-neutral fashion. The decision to purchase textbooks, in contrast,
is viewpoint neutral as a generic matter. Thus, like NEA grants, government
decision-makers can proceed to the next step. The government may make some
value judgments in selecting among the competing candidates. Rust never gets
past the first step because the government defined the category in a viewpoint-
laden manner. See supra notes 103-121 and accompanying text (examining
Rust).
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educational process,150 surely the First Amendment imposes
outer limits on this power.'5 ' A school board could not, for
example, constitutionally require instructors to teach that the
New Deal never took place, simply because the board wished to
inculcate only free-market values in its students. Similarly, we
cannot deem acceptable the government's conscious falsification
or manipulation of historical fact and analysis for the avowed
purpose of indoctrinating students.
152
IV. REJECTING ALTERNATIVE MODELS
Before the groundwork for acceptance of our structure is
complete, we must explore the comparative merits of alternative
models previously suggested for measuring the constitutionality
of government subsidization of expression. The Supreme Court's
opinion in Rust illustrates the inherent defects of the non-speech
specific "unconstitutional conditions" approach.5 3  Moreover,
neither of two other models previously put forward by scholars
adequately resolves the difficult constitutional issues surround-
ing subsidy decisions.
A. THE "SPHERES-OF-NEUTRALiTY" APPROACH
Professor David Cole has proposed a structure for gauging
the constitutionality of government subsidization of speech. 54
Although Cole purports to consider the benefits and dangers of
government subsidization of speech,'55 his approach fails
sufficiently to accommodate these considerations. As a result,
Cole's approach would allow the restriction of government
150. See supra text accompanying notes 137-146 (providing a discussion of
the role of public schools in the inculcation of values).
151. See Board of Ed. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (finding that the
"discretion of the states and local schoolE]boards in matters of education must
be exercised in a manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of
the First Amendment").
152. The obvious danger here is the evidentiary problem of establishing the
fact of the government's improper motive. See supra discussion at text
accompanying note 97 (stating that the burden of establishing the government
motive as improper is on the plaintiff).
153. See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 115-121 (critiquing
Rust).
154. See Cole, supra note 68, at 748 ("A better way of accommodating the
opposing interest implicated when government funds speech is to identify and
enforce spheres of neutrality and independence.").
155. Id. at 702-08 (discussing of the problems associated with government
funding of speech).
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subsidization of speech even when that subsidization would
actually foster First Amendment values, while simultaneously
permitting government subsidization of speech when those
subsidies would threaten these values.
1. A Description of the Approach
In establishing his approach for gauging the constitution-
ality of governmental subsidization of speech, Cole initially
recognizes that a great deal of similarity exists between the
government's direct restriction of speech and the government's
selective subsidization of speech. 15 6  He notes that, with
regard to direct government restriction of speech, 57 courts
generally enforce "a strict neutrality mandate."'58 That is,
"government generally must remain neutral as to the content
and viewpoint of speech, absent a compelling justification."'59
Cole then questions whether this neutrality mandate is "trans-
ferable to selective government funding of speech." 6 ° He
contends that the mandate is not perfectly transferable because
of the nature of government speech. He recognizes that "[w]e
cannot mandate neutral funding across the board, because such
a rule would disable government as we know it." 16' Cole,
however, believes that the neutrality mandate should not be
completely rejected. He argues that "[i]f government were
allowed unfettered discretion to support speech that it favors,
public debate would be subject to substantial co-optation." 62
To accommodate these concerns, Cole proposes a "structural
accommodation, attuned to the role that certain institutions play
in maintaining a robust public debate and an autonomous
citizenry." 163  This accommodation "draw[s] on the neutrality
principle that governs selective government prohibitions on
speech, but [applies] it only to certain spheres of government
funding.""6 Therefore, Cole proposes that:
[w]here neutrality is consistent with... an institution's fimction, strict
156. Id. at 712.
157. Courts recognize limited exceptions for obscenity, libel, and fighting
words.
158. Cole, supra note 68, at 712.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 713.
161. Id. at 714.
162. Id. at 715.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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neutrality should be required; where some non-neutral content
decisions must be made, the first amendment should guarantee a
degree of independence for the decision-maker. Where, on the other
hand, the institution does not play an important role in furthering
public dialogue or individual autonomy, or where non-neutral
government speech is necessary to further an important government
function or first amendment values, government should be free to
support speech non-neutrally.1"
Under Cole's approach, when "government non-neutrality does
not pose a substantial risk of skewing or indoctrinating, it
should be permitted."'66 Cole believes that this risk is unac-
ceptably high only in certain predetermined institutional
settings or expressive contexts. He refers to his approach as a
"spheres-of-neutrality" approach. 67 Indicating that the Su-
preme Court has recognized them as such, Cole initially
identifies public fora, 6' public education,'69  and the
press 70 as "spheres of neutrality."'7 ' He suggests a three-
pronged approach for determining whether other settings qualify
as "spheres of neutrality":
First,-the Court should ask whether government control of the content
of speech in the institution would be threatening to a vigorous public
debate or to the autonomy of listeners; second, the Court should ask
whether the internal operation of the institution is consistent with a
first amendment neutrality mandate; and third, where non-neutrality
poses a threat to free speech values, but strict neutrality would impede
the institution's internal functioning, the court should ask whether the
independence of speakers can be structurally accommodated in some
intermediate fashion.
172
With this approach as his guide, Cole finds that the arts' 7' and
professional fiduciary counseling 74 also qualify as spheres of
neutrality.
2. A Critique of the Approach
Many flaws exist in Cole's approach. Initially, it is unclear
from his own analysis whether any forum exists in which non-
neutral funding should be permitted. Indeed, Professor Cole
165. Id. at 716.
166. Id. at 737.
167. Id. at 716.
168. Id. at 717.
169. Id. at 723.
170. Id. at 731.
171. Id. at 717.
172. Id. at 736.
173. Id. at 739.
174. Id. at 743.
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never suggests one. In any event, if settings do exist that do not
qualify as "spheres of neutrality," Cole's approach does not
clearly explain why the government should be permitted to fund
them in a non-neutral manner to any degree that it desires.
Indeed, government non-neutrality in any setting may under-
mine First Amendment values.
175
An examination of his classification of the arts as a sphere
of neutrality underscores the problems with Cole's approach.
While it is incontrovertible, as Cole notes, that art "is a forum
for dissent and opposition"176 and that government control
over the arts would "be threatening to a vigorous public de-
bate,"' 7 it is far less clear that one could not say the same of
every other forum or subject of expression. Although Cole
correctly notes the historical importance of the arts as a forum
for dissent and opposition,17 such a history is not dispositive
of whether an institution today serves as such a forum. The
logical question one could pose to Cole, then, is whether a forum
exists over which government control does not threaten vigorous
public debate.
B. THE "CONDITION-OF-PUBLIC-DISCOURSE" APPROACH
Professor Owen Fiss has objected to a "criterion-based"
examination of government subsidization of the arts, such as the
one we have proposed. Fiss argues that examinations that rely
on an inquiry into the criteria on which the government bases its
funding decisions are suspect for three reasons. First, he argues
that "[w~hile in the discrimination context it might be possible
to construct a finite and rather well-understood list of forbidden
criteria ... in the free speech context no such list readily
suggests itself." 179 Second, Fiss argues that even if forbidden
criteria could be located, "often the real reason for an allocative
decision cannot be authoritatively ascertained."8 ° Finally,
Fiss argues that the criterion approach is particularly inappro-
priate under the First Amendment because such an approach
focuses on individual fairness, while the "First Amendment is a
175. See supra text accompanying notes 73-79 (outlining the dangers of
government subsidization of speech).
176. Cole, supra note 68, at 740.
177. Id. at 736.
178. See id. at 739-40 (discussing the arts as a "sphere of neutrality").
179. Fiss, supra note 124, at 2098.
180. Id. at 2099.
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guarantee of collective self-determination." 8'
As an alternative to the criterion approach, Fiss proposes
that "the focus [of a system gauging the constitutionality of NEA
grants] should be on the condition of public discourse, not the
process by which that condition was created."'82 Fiss argues
that the judiciary
should keep the focus on effects, specifically the effect the exercise of
state power has on public debate. ... Such a judgment requires a
sense of the public agenda, a grasp of the issues that are now before
the public and what might plausibly be brought before it, and then an
appraisal of the state of public discourse ... to see whether all the
positions on the issue are being fully and fairly presented so that the
people can make a meaningful choice."a
For example, Fiss concludes that Robert Mapplethorpe's art
would require ftmding because the denial of a grant "would
impoverish public debate" by preventing a voice that counters
the prevailing orthodoxy regarding homosexuality from reaching
the marketplace.8
Serious flaws exist in both Fiss's criticism of the criterion-
based approach and his suggested alternative. Whatever one
thinks of Fiss's criticisms of a criterion-based approach, one
should find considerable difficulty in accepting his suggested
"condition-of-public-discourse" alternative. Ironically, while Fiss
criticizes a criterion-based approach because of its inability to
fashion workable, principled criteria, his suggested alternative
suffers from a complete lack of workable, predictable standards
by which to determine its applicability. How, one must ask, can
a reviewing court possibly decide whether, absent public funding,
the ideas in question would not reach the public?
Even if one were to accept Fiss's first two criticisms of a
criterion-based analysis, his conclusion following these criticisms
remains suspect. Fiss assumes that it is more difficult under the
181. Id. at 2100.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2101. Professor Stanley Ingber argues, in a manner similar to
Fiss, that
[plublic subsidies of the arts ... should be allocated so that more is
said and more are exposed to that which is said than would exist
without public subsidies. Public monies will advance public discourse
by supporting the kind of art that would not have found a ready patron
in the private market, not by simply allowing more people to say the
same thing.
Ingber, supra note 124, at 1621-22 (footnotes omitted).
184. Fiss, supra note 124, at 2101.
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First Amendment than it is under the Fourteenth Amendment
to identify forbidden criteria, and even if one locates forbidden
criteria, it will be difficult to know when the NEA has relied on
these criteria in allocating scarce resources. Although these may
be valid observations, the difficulties they present do not
invalidate an inquiry into these factors. Certainly one can point
to criteria on which the NEA may not constitutionally rely.
Under our approach, for example, the NEA may not make
subsidization decisions based on the unrelated viewpoints of
those applying for funding. The government thus may not
refuse to fund an artist simply because that artist produces art
advocating liberal political principles. What's more, once one
identifies forbidden criteria, the possible difficulty of determining
whether the government has employed them in a particular case
should not preclude a court from attempting to make this
determination.
Fiss's third criticism is also misplaced. He argues that a
criterion-based methodology is particularly inappropriate under
the First Amendment because it focuses on individual fairness,
while "the First Amendment is a guarantee of collective self-
determination." The approach we propose does not rely exclu-
sively on notions of individualism. Quite to the contrary, our
approach considers notions of communitarian interest in addition
to elements of individual self-development. Indeed, our approach
deems certain criteria unconstitutional both because of the
potential effect of reliance on those criteria on community self-
government and because of the potential effect of reliance on
those criteria on individual self-realization. 85 The decision not
to fund a work of art because of the political viewpoint it
espouses, therefore, remains suspect because such a decision
might allow the government to skew artificially the marketplace
of ideas and therefore undermine both autonomy and
communitarian values that arguably underlie the First Amend-
ment.
8 6
Finally, Fiss's approach all but eliminates the power of those
making an award to consider the inherent artistic merit or
quality of a work, the criterion on which NEA funding was
185. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (enumerating
communitarian and autonomy theories as two broad theories of freedom of
expression).
186. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (discussing the values
that underlie the First Amendment).
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intended to be based in the first place.' 7 Under Fiss's struc-
ture, a monochromatic crayon drawing which voices a viewpoint
that is "otherwise-insufficiently represented" in the marketplace
of ideas should logically be chosen for funding over a painting
universally deemed a superior work of art, if that painting
espouses a viewpoint that "reinforces the prevailing orthodoxy."
Fiss's approach thus places significant restraints on the ability
of government to foster individual self-realization and human
flourishing by promoting and encouraging literary or artistic
excellence.' 88 Our structure avoids these two problems by
allowing government to fund art regardless of the political
viewpoint it expresses and by simultaneously enabling govern-
ment to adhere to the statutory objective of the NEA to fund the
highest quality art.
CONCLUSION
In proposing our suggested analytical structure to determine
the constitutionality of government subsidization of expression,
we have employed a methodology that has been described as a
priori balancing.'89 We have attempted to fashion broadly-
phrased, flexible guidelines because we believe that these
categories best fulfill the purposes served by the protection of
free expression. These selections are by no means free of doubt
or controversy. Moreover, application of these abstract catego-
ries to specific fact situations may not always be obvious. As we
have shown, however, none of the few alternatives that other
commentators have suggested provides a viable method for
sorting out the complex constitutional issues inherent in the
187. Perhaps anticipating this particular criticism, Fiss argues later in his
article that
[t]he duty to attend to effects does not mean... an end to merit. What
it does mean is either a reexamination of the notions of merit that
underlie funding decisions or, alas, a sacrifice of some of the values
that might be furthered by notions of merit that do not incorporate, or,
in fact, are antagonistic to, the constitutional goal of producing a public
debate that is worthy of our democratic aspirations.
Fiss, supra note 124, at 2103. However, Fiss merely proposes a redefinition of
merit that devalues consideration of the inherent quality of a piece of art and
substitutes a consideration of the ability of the art to contribute a voice to a
debate on an issue.
188. An additional problem with an approach that turns on a determination
of whether or not a work of art "reinforces the prevailing orthodoxy" is the
obvious difficulty in making such a determination.
189. See Ely, supra note 58, at 1496 (advocating use of a priori balancing in
free speech cases).
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review of subsidy decisions.
We focus our proposed structure in an effort to tame the
"Jekyll-Hyde" nature of speech subsidization by government. By
selectively subsidizing speech, government may artificially skew
public debate, thereby undermining the effective operation of the
democratic process. Selective subsidization also may deter an
individual's freely chosen expressive activity, thereby threaten-
ing autonomy and self-realization values. Yet a complete denial
of governmental power to subsidize expression could also
significantly undermine First Amendment values by precluding
the government from facilitating communicative and expressive
activities of private individuals and entities. Our structure
seeks to reconcile these competing strains.
One may think the analytical structure proposed here is
vulnerable to criticism from opposite perspectives. On the one
hand, one might argue that the approach overly complicates and
confuses the constitutional inquiry because it provides neither a
single yes or no answer to the question of the constitutionality
of expressive subsidies, nor a single, workable criterion by which
to separate constitutional subsidies from unconstitutional ones.
On the other hand, one might criticize the structure for seeking
mechanistic, easily applied solutions to what are in reality
difficult and subjective value choices. We reject both critiques.
That difficult and subjective value choices are involved cannot
alter the basic fact that somehow those choices must be made.
Our structure attempts to balance the competing interests ex
ante, by fashioning guiding principles designed to implement
universally accepted principles of free speech theory. While they
are far from mechanistic or automatic in their application,
neither do they suffer from total malleability or turn substan-
tially on the subjective judgment of the individual implementing
them. As a result, we believe they represent a significant
advance over previously suggested approaches.
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